Knowing as having the right to be sure, by A. J. Ayer.--Knowledge and belief, by N. Malcolm.--Is justified true belief knowledge? By E. L. Gettier.--The foundation of empirical statements, by R. M. Chisholm.--Knowledge, truth, and evidence, by K. Lehrer.--A causal theory of knowing, by A. I. Goldman.--The explication of 'X knows that p', by B. Skyrms.--An analysis of factual knowledge, by P. Unger.--Why I know so much more than you do, by W. W. Rozeboom.--Does knowing imply believing? By J. Harrison.--Knowledge, (...) by examples, by C. Radford.--The logic of knowing, by R. M. Chisholm.--Bibliography (p. 221-224). (shrink)

This collection of essays, originally published in 1970 by Random House, gathers together some of the best initial responses to the problems raised by Edmund Gettier's celebrated critique of the traditional analysis of knowledge. Designed for upper-level courses and seminars in undergraduate philosophy programs and is intended as an introduction to epistemology from the analytic point of view.

This is an ambitious and frustrating book. Among the many virtues which Moser claims for it are all of the following: it answers the need to counteract certain “epistemologically harmful muddles with careful distinctions and arguments” ; it provides the reader with a “forceful” reply to both justification scepticism and knowledge scepticism and argues that both can be “effectively challenged, if not refuted” ; it “solves” the Gettier problem ; and it not only removes the “normative mystery” from epistemic concepts (...) such as knowledge and justification, but provides a meta-justification which will allow us, the readers, to see why the theoretical account offered in its pages is preferable to its competitors. It is worth mentioning that the competitors over whom Moser claims his theory has a “dialectical edge” include accounts authored by Chisholm, Lehrer, Goldman, Alston, Bonjour, Rorty, Foley and Stroud. As I said, this is an ambitious book. (shrink)